The Hair-Splitters: Reno and Wallace, 1932-1933 by Schuyler, Michael W.
The Annals of Iowa 
Volume 43 Number 6 (Fall 1976) pps. 403-429 
The Hair-Splitters: Reno and Wallace, 1932-1933 
Michael W. Schuyler 
ISSN 0003-4827 
No known copyright restrictions. 
Recommended Citation 
Schuyler, Michael W. "The Hair-Splitters: Reno and Wallace, 1932-1933." The Annals of 
Iowa 43 (1976), 403-429. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.11297 
Hosted by Iowa Research Online 
The Hair-Splitters:
Reno and Wallace, 1932-1933
Michaei W. Schuyier
FROM THE LATE SUMMER OF 1932 UNTIL THE FALL OF 1933,
many Americans, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
feared that an agrarian revolution would sweep the country-
side and topple the existing power structure in America. Dur-
ing that period of crisis two Iowans, Milo Reno and Henry A.
Wallace, were frequently pictured as polar opposites by the
press. Reno, as president of the militant Farmers' Holiday
Association, symbolized the forces of agrarian radicalism and
Wallace, as Roosevelt's first secretary of agriculture, was seen
as the defender of the established order. Although their differ-
ences were real and should not be minimized, a careful exami-
nation of their correspondence suggests many similarities in
their approach to the Depression in the early 1930s. While
Reno and Wallace were bitter political enemies, their personal
"war" can best be understood as the result of differences in
personality, style, circumstance, and position, rather than dis-
agreement on substantive ideological issues.
In the summer of 1932, as farm prices plummeted, and a
wave of mortgage foreclosures swept across the farm belt,
Milo Reno established a new organization, the Farmers' Holi-
day Association, to articulate the demands of angry and frus-
trated farmers in the Middle West. The former president of
the Iowa Farmers' Union was sixty-five years of age in 1932
and had fought farmers' battles with unrelenting energy
since the turn of the twentieth century. Using the threat of a
farm strike to enforce the Holiday Association's demands for
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inflation, cost of production, and refinanced farm mortgages,
Reno's rhetoric and bombastic diatribes brought back memo-
ries of the farm revolt which had inflamed the agrarian com-
munity at the turn of the century. '
Reno, a former Greenbacker and Populist, demonstrated
his heritage when, along with a host of other veteran farm
leaders, he resurrected a favorite rural panacea to meet the
Depression: monetary inflation. The Farmers' Holiday Asso-
ciation leader quickly dismissed sound money doctrines and
argued that the honest labor of the farmer was being stolen by
the money power in the East. ^ Although Reno ahd his close
friend John A. Simpson, head ofthe Farmers' Union, were the
most vociferous supporters of inflation, a number of younger
farm leaders, who had not experienced the farm revolt of the
late nineteenth century at first hand, also endorsed inflation
as a way out of the Depression. Foremost among them was
Henry A. Wallace, the influential editor of Wallaces' Farmer
and Iowa Homestead. ^ Still in his early forties, Wallace readily
admitted that there was a philosophical similarity between his
position on money and the position of the greenbacker and
free silver advocates of an earlier age. Believing that manipu-
lation of the currency would raise farm prices and would pro-
mote the general welfare in the United States, and the entire
world, the Iowa editor crusaded for an "honest dollar"
through a policy of "controlled inflation."^ As early as 1931,
after criticizing Reno for not being active enough in the battle
for inflation, Wallace encouraged the future Holiday Associa-
tion leader to "Get into the fight vigorously and with both feet
'John L. Shover, Combelt Rebellion: The Farmers'Holiday Association (Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press. 1965). 25-27; Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks. Agricultural Discon-
tent in theMiddle West 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1951), 441-451; A.
William Hoglund, "Wisconsin Dairy Farmers on Strike," Agricultural History. XXXV (Janu-
ary, 1961), 24-35.
^Milo Reno to Henry A, Wallace, December 28, 1931. Henry A. Wallace Papers. The Uni-
versity of Iowa Library. (Hereafter cited as HWP); Reno to Roy Hildebrand. August 8. 1933.
Milo Reno Papers, The University of Iowa Library. (Hereafter cited as MRP)
'For studies of Wallace see Russell Lord. The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1947); and Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The Agrarian
Years, 1910-1940 (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1968).
'Wallace to Border Bowman, January 12. 1932. HWR,
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instead of standing on the outskirts and criticizing others for
not punching hard enough." Apparently not particular about
what method was used to promote infiation, he exhorted
Reno,
Why don't you use all of your splendid energy on behalf of re-
monetizing silver, on behalf of bimetalism, on behalf of sym-
metalism, on behalf of greenbacks, or on behalf of something
else which will effectively raise the price level?*
Although Reno protested that he had been working for the
"greenback theory" of money and argued that Congress, if it
would stop "palavering" and "playing politics" could solve
the Depression in ten days, Wallace continued to fear that
Reno's capacity for "fine spun distinction" would divide
farmers amongst themselves and prevent the formation of a
united front to do battle for agriculture.' Although Wallace
would continue to work for inflation, his relationship to the
farm protest movement, and to Milo Reno, changed radically
when, in February, 1933, he was named secretary of agricul-
ture by President Roosevelt.
Wallace, whose father had been secretary of agriculture
under Harding and Coolidge, was a natural choice for the
appointment. A well-known figure in the corn belt, Wallace
had deserted the Republican Party in 1928 to work for Al
Smith and had actively campaigned for Roosevelt in 1932.
Wallace, who understood that long-range solutions, as well as
the immediate tonic of infiation, were necessary to bolster the
sagging farm economy, labored under no illusions about the
immensity of the task he would face in Washington. After he
had accepted the nomination he wrote in Wallaces' Earmer,
It is fairly easy to put out a fire before it gets much of a start. To
put it out after wind and time and neglect have fanned it into a
fiaming rage is a task of greater difficulty. The new administra-
tion must make up for twelve years of lost time.'
Milo Reno could not have agreed more.
Although Ferner Nuhn, of The New Republic, optimisti-
'Wallace to Reno, December 24, 1931, HWP.
'Wallace to Reno, December 29,1931, HWP; Reno to Wallace, December 28, 1931, MRP.
'Quoted in Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa. 325.
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cally reported, " . . . there is little doubt that in Henry A.
Wallace the Middle West contributes to national affairs an
authentic figure, not out of place in the line of George W.
Norris, and the elder La Follette,"* Milo Reno was less than
enthusiastic about Wallace's appointment. Reno, who had
supported John A. Simpson for the post, thought Wallace
honest but predicted that he would become another Hyde, a
disparaging reference to Hoover's secretary of agriculture. ' He
wrote to Usher L. Burdick that Wallace ". . . . is academic,
also erratic, unstable and thoroughly bureauized in his ideas,
and I doubt very much if he would be any great improvement
over the present jackass who occupies that position."'" Wal-
lace, even before his appointment as secretary, had also begun
to question Reno's worth to the farm movement. In Decem-
ber, 1931, Wallace pondered Reno's motives and expressed
fears that he might be sidetracking the money issue because he
was afraid that some of the "Farm Bureau folks" might be re-
ceiving some advantage. He concluded on a note of sarcasm
that "Milo probably means all right but often times his tongue
runs away with him." " The seeds of bitter conflict had already
been sown.
On March 16, 1933, Roosevelt sent a special message to
Congress asking for the passage of a farm bill, entitled the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, to bring relief to the depressed
agricultural economy. Although the aim of the bill was clear—
its objective was to restore farm purchasing power to a posi-
tion comparable to the equality agriculture had enjoyed with
industry in the five-year period from 1909-1914—the means of
achieving this "parity" was not clearly stated in the omnibus
measure that was sent to Congress. '^  As debate on the farm
bill began it was soon apparent that rural dissidents, led by
•Ferner Nuhn, "Wallace of Iowa," The New Republic, LXXIV (March 15, 1933), 127.
'Reno to Thomas E. Cashman, January 13, 1933, MRP.
'"Reno to Usher L. Burdick, January 25, 1933, MRP.
"Wallace to Andrew Shearer, December 29, 1931, HWP.
'^Samuel I. Rosenman (comp.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
with a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt: The Year of Crisis,
1933, Volume II (New York: Random House, 1938), 74, 175-180; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The
Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 39;
Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West 1900-1939, 468-470.
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courtesy ofthelowa State Historical Department, Division of
the State Historical Society.
Henry A. Wallace
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Reno and Simpson, would place tremendous pressure on
Roosevelt to add an infiationary amendment to the farm bill.
Farmers hoped that infiation would cause an immediate rise
in prices and, by cheapening the value of the dollar, would les-
sen the extent of rural indebtedness. Some infiationists
wanted to do something about silver, others favored devalua-
tion, while still others proposed to encourage inflation by
printing paper money. Although the farm bill eventually en-
acted by Congress did include the Thomas Amendment,
which gave President Roosevelt wide discretionary powers to
promote inflation, by the fall of 1933 the immediate relief ex-
pected by farmers had not yet come to the farm belt. " Al-
though Roosevelt was directly responsible for the administra-
tion's program, he was still riding high on a wave of public
support and enthusiasm. As a consequence, most of the criti-
cism of the New Deal farm program was directed by rural mal-
contents at his youthful secretary of agriculture.
Before Wallace became secretary of agriculture he had
worried that Roosevelt might not go far enough in inflating the
dollar. Although convinced that Roosevelt was an "inflation-
ist," he wrote to George F. Warren, of Cornell University, on
August 26, 1932, that "I am a little afraid there are some con-
flicts in the Governor's thinking on the money question which
need some straightening out."'" A few days later he wrote to
George N. Peek, who would become the first head of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration, that Roosevelt was
a "fine gentleman," but that it appeared the outcome of his
presidency would depend primarily upon whom he looked to
for advice. '* Although the inflationists, at least temporarily in
1933, did manage to capture Roosevelt's attention and the
New Deal did attempt a moderate program of "controlled"
inflation, it did not go far enough, or fast enough, to satisfy
"Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1966), 300-303; James F. Byrnes. Ail in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publish-
ers, 1958), 77-78; Allan Seymour Everest, Morgenthau. The New Deal and Silver (New York:
King's Crown Press, 1950), 25; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal. 41-42.
"Wallace to G. F. Warren, August 26, 1932, HWP.
'^Wallace to George N. Peek, August 29, 1932, HWP.
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the farm community. Ironically Wallace, who before he be-
came secretary of agriculture had worked so hard to convince
farmers to support inflation, now became identified in the
minds of many rural militants as the primary force resisting
the implementation of radical inflationary measures.
As secretary of agriculture, Wallace was forced to take a
broader view ofthe Depression than he had when he had been
the editor of Wallaces' Farmer. In August, 1933, Wallace was
concerned about an impending farm revolt; he warned Roose-
velt that many farmers thought that inflation was the only
thing that was really needed to raise farm prices. Although
Wallace continued to support inflationary policies, he also
pointed out that ". . . . in the long run, inflation does not in-
crease the foreign demand for our surplus farm products and
does nothing toward adjusting the supply of our farm products
to the home market." " Later in the month, while still trying to
follow a course of moderation, Wallace again warned the
president:
The next month or two will be very difficult and I shall be very
surprised if the farm organizations, being continually pressed as
they are by the violent holiday group and other left wing orga-
nizations, do not stage a demonstration here in the city. If this is
done, it will be a question of how lucky we are in keeping the
wrong kind of publicity out ofthe newspapers."
Meanwhile Milo Reno, who would play a leading part in the
mounting offensive against Wallace, was doing everything he
could to get the "right" kind of publicity in the newspapers.
Abandoning all restraint in his denunciation of Wallace,
Reno called Wallace a "jackass" and an "ignoramus" and in-
sisted that he had never known a member of the Wallace fam-
ily who had not been mentally unbalanced. " He also joined
"Wallace to Roosevelt. August 21, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt Correspondence, National
Archives and Records Service. General Services Administration. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park. New York, Official FUe I (Hereafter cited as FDRL),
"Wallace to Roosevelt. August 22. 1933, FDRL.
"Frank Moorhead. State Agent, Bureau of Investigation to Wallace. September 23. 1933.
National Archives. National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration.
Washington. D.C.. Record Group 16, Secretary of Agriculture. General Correspondence (Here-
after cited as NARS).
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courtesy of the Des Moines Register and Tribune
Milo Reno
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the Iowa Farmers' Union in demanding that Wallace resign as
secretary of agriculture. " Wallace was not surprised by the
attacks; he had expected them earlier, but he admitted, some-
what gloomily, "I must confess that deliberate misquotation
and misunderstanding pain me. . . ."^° Although Wallace
still had his defenders, their voices were drowned out by the
vituperative attacks of rural militants who promised the
desperate farm population that their panaceas would end the
Depression.
Demands for infiation were heightened when farmers com-
plained, not without justice, that the New Deal was pushing
up the price of industrial goods more rapidly than the prices of
agricultural products.^' Wallace, although he must have
found it increasingly difficult to be a member of the Roosevelt
"team," again defended the administration. While Wallace
wanted prosperity for agriculture, he now spoke for consumers
as well as farmers. He pointed out that a rise in farm prices,
without a simultaneous revival of the industrial sector of the
economy, would be harmful to consumer interests because it
would increase their food costs without increasing their buying
power." While Wallace had, in effect, asked the farm com-
munity to make temporary sacrifices for the general good of
society, Milo Reno, representing a smaller constituency, con-
cluded that the secretary's stance had " . . . destroyed the last
hope that he can be of any benefit in solving our problems." "
Accusing Wallace of "perfidy" for refusing to infiate con-
sumer prices, Reno argued, "It is very evident to me that no
relief can be hoped for until Secretary Wallace's position is
"The New York Times, September 22, 1933.
"Wallace to Moorhead, September 23, 1933, NARS, RG 16.
"O. L. Brownlee to Wallace, September 15, 1933, FDRL, OF 227; Richard L. Metcalfe to
Charles F. Honer, September 14, 1933, FDRL, OF 227-M; Hans Pauli to Wallace, September 6,
1933, FDRL, OF 1.
"Reno to F. T. Markert, September 2, 1933, MRP; the New York Times. November 12-14,
1933; Press Conferences of President Roosevelt, 1933-1936. (Microfilm, Hyde Park, New York:
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1956), Press Conference #51, September 13. 1933. p. 264;
Roosevelt to Clyde Herring, September 14, 1933, FDRL, OF 327.
"Reno to C. E. Camshan, September 2, 1933, MRP.
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held by some man, who is really the Secretary of Agriculture
instead of the tool of the Wall Street bunch." ^^
Although in the fall of 1933 Wallace privately warned
Roosevelt "there is a great storm now brewing" and that it
might be necessary to come out openly for infiation in the near
future, publicly he attacked the "hell raisers," an obvious
reference to Reno, for not giving the administration a
chance." Wallace, who pointed out that "reactionaries" were
also attacking the New Deal, argued that attacks from the left
might eventually result in the reactionaries coming into their
own again. " At the same time, however, Wallace tried to edu-
cate urban America to the ultimate necessity for higher farm
prices. Speaking in Chicago the secretary reiterated the
dangers of attacks from the left and right and argued that the
cities could not regain prosperity until agriculture was healthy
again. He concluded with the dire warning, "If the people of
Chicago cannot become possessed of a more statesmanlike
knowledge of the crisis, the consequences will be such that
Chicago must surely be reduced to an ash heap." ' ' In Muncie,
Indiana, combining the language of the "statesman" with
rhetoric which rivaled Reno's diatribes, Wallace asked his
audience.
Do you want to go back to the vomit of capitalism . . ? But on
the other hand, do we want to foment discord, prejudice and vio-
lence, which tend to break us up into warring groups, with
hatred continually breeding hatred and with no prospect for a
constructive outcome? I believe there is a middle course by which
we can shake off the leadership of discredited capitalists without
committing ourselves to the follies of the hell-raisers."
By the fall of 1933, although sentiment for inñation con-
tinued to be rampant throughout the farm belt, it was obvious
that Wallace, and the Roosevelt administration, had managed
to convince many farmers that Milo Reno was a left-wing ex-
"Reno to F. T. Markert, September 2, 1933, MRP.
"Wallace to Roosevelt, September 7, 1933 and Wallace to Roosevelt, September 11, 1933;
the New York Times. November 12, 1933.
"The New York Times. November 12, 1933.
''Times, November 14, 1933.
"Times, November 15, 1933.
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tremist who threatened, by deviating from the political cen-
ter, to aHow the old order to return to power. Wallace con-
tinued to believe in inflation, but he also believed that it could
bring effective relief only if the power to manipulate the cur-
rency remained in the hands of the administration. Although
the verbal assaults continued unabated, the difference between
Wallace and Reno on inflation was one of degree, not of prin-
ciple. Had Wallace not become secretary of agriculture, given
his past record, he might well have become a primary force
outside the administration to force the New Deal to move
"left" by rapidly inflating the farmers' dollar.
Another divisive issue between "conservatives" and "radi-
cals," which lasted throughout the decade of the 1930s, was
the question of whether the "voluntary domestic allotment
plan," or various proposals for guaranteeing farmers the "cost
of production," would be the primary vehicle used by the
Roosevelt administration to lift the nation's farmers out of the
Depression. M. L. Wilson, more than any other individual,
deserves the credit for the ultimate acceptance of the domestic
allotment plan. " By the spring of 1932 Wilson had shaped the
ideas of a number of agrarian theorists, including W. J. Spill-
man, John D. Black, and Beardsley Ruml into a workable
legislative program. His plan called for farmers to enter into a
contract with the government to limit production to an
amount determined by agricultural officials in Washington.
Farmers in turn were to be paid benefit payments, financed
from taxes collected from processors of agricultural products.
Wilson further insisted that the program be decentralized and
be based upon voluntary cooperation, not compulsion. Unlike
other farm proposals being debated in the 1930s, Wilson's
plan, by calling for controlled production, took cognizance of
the farmers' changing position in the world of international
trade. ">
"Vf. D. Rowley, M. L. Wilson and the Campaign for the Domestic Allotment (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1970); Richard S. Kirkendall, "A Professor in Farm Politics,"
Mid-America. XLI (October, 1959), 210-217; Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in
the Middle West 1900-1939, 452-454.
'°Ibid.: Joseph S. Davis, Wheat and the AAA (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1935), 31-32; Urd , The Wallaces of Iowa, 292-311.
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An alternative plan, presented in many forms during the
1930s, was the cost of production plan, which had won the
enthusiastic support of most militant farm leaders, including
Milo Reno and John A. Simpson. The plan called for officials
in Washington to fix prices, as they had during the war, based
upon the farmers' cost of production plus a guaranteed profit.
After the cost of production had been determined for individ-
ual crops, processors would be required to purchase farm pro-
ducts at that price on the amount of agricultural production
consumed domestically. Surplus farm products would be
stored on the farm or dumped on the foreign market for what-
ever price they would bring. Like the McNary-Haugen plans
ofthe 1920s, the cost of production plans, by avoiding a call
for acreage reduction or production controls, in effect asked
for a two-price system for American agriculture.''
To many contemporary observers in the early 1930s both
the domestic allotment proposal and the cost of production
plans were considered "radical," primarily because they in-
volved planning and called for the active intervention of the
federal government to stablize the farm economy. To many
the cost of production plan appeared to be the most radical
because it called upon the government to fix prices, a move
which would have required careful governmental control of
the entire economy; others, however, saw the domestic allot-
ment plan as being equally radical for, although it allowed for
a greater play of the free market, it required the government
to intervene in the lives of each individual farmer to make pro-
duction controls effective. When Milo Reno endorsed the cost
of production scheme, and Henry A. Wallace the voluntary
domestic allotment proposal, the real issues were again ob-
scured as the "radical" Reno emerged to do battle with the
"conservative" Wallace.
"John L. Shover, "Populism in the Nineteen-Thirties: The Battle for the AAA." Agricul-
tural History. XXXIX (January, 1965), 18; John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy 1921-1933
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. 1960). 217-218; GUbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and
the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1954). 139, 160-161; Wil-
liam R, Johnson, "Farm Policy in Transition: 1932: Year of Crisis," Unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation (University of Oklahoina. 1963). 64-66.
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Although Wallace had rather quickly decided that over-
production was one of the major problems facing the Ameri-
can farmer, he was not a particularly early or enthusiastic sup-
porter of the domestic allotment plan. By early 1932 Wallace
had given up the hope that export dumping could be used, in
the face of mounting tariff barriers, to solve the farm prob-
lem. " He was also aware, however, that it would be difficult to
convince farmers to control their production." Choosing the
correct method of dealing with overproduction was for Wal-
lace far more significant than simply restoring prosperity. It
was, in his mind, ultimately a choice between isolationism and
internationalism.''' Assuming that an endorsement of the
domestic allotment plan meant the acceptance of our declin-
ing share of world markets, Wallace wrote to Roosevelt in
April, 1932, that the people must be educated . . . to the
necessity of choosing either the isolation path or the world
cooperation path. . . . When our people realize this, they will
choose one path or the other intelligently and act accord-
ingly.""
In the spring of 1932 Wallace appeared to be leaning in the
direction of "internationalism" and despaired at the difficul-
ties inherent in trying to implement the domestic allotment
plan. He informed Roosevelt that while the plan had much to
commend it, ". . . when you sit down to seriously consider the
details of a bill for carrying out the 'Domestic Allotment
Plan,' you find that you are working quite definitely toward a
bureaucratic plan of state socialism."" Although by August,
1932, Wallace was still not completely sold on the program, he
began to realize that the plan had many political advantages. ' '
By December Wallace was finally convinced that "The Volun-
tary Domestic Allotment Plan is the most intelligent scheme
"Wallace to Clifford Gregory, February 10, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to E. L. Bilbert, February 4, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to Thomas T. Kerl, December 4, 1931; to F. A. Wirt, April 11, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to Roosevelt, April 11, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to Roosevelt, April 23, 1932; see also Wallace to C. F. Lytle, April 22, 1932,
HWP.
"Wallace to Henry I. Harriman, August 26, 1932, HWP.
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yet brought forward to furnish agriculture with a program for
an intelligent, orderly retreat." ' ' When Wallace was ap-
pointed secretary of agriculture, he automatically became the
most important spokesman for the domestic allotment plan in
the country.
Milo Reno, even before Wallace became secretary of agri-
culture, rejected the plan. Since the plan was supported by a
number of important business groups, including Henry I.
Harriman, president of the United States Chamber of Com-
merce, Reno was convinced that the domestic allotment plan
was but "a gesture to mislead."" When Roosevelt's farm bill
was introduced in Congress, with provisions for implementing
the domestic allotment plan, Reno and John A. Simpson tried
to convince Roosevelt that he should drop the plan and en-
dorse their own cost of production amendment. Unleashing an
obvious threat to Roosevelt's leadership, they warned the
president, " . . . we do not desire to seek redresses of our
wrongs and grievances through force except as a last resort,
but we are free men and we refuse to become serfs and slaves
of the usurer and the money king.""" Labeling Wallace and
other members of the administration "pussy-footers" and
"compromisers," Reno predicted catastrophic consequences
for the nation if Roosevelt's farm bill became law without the
cost of production amendment."' He wrote to Cecil Johnson,
"The farmers of this nation will either be conceded cost of pro-
duction and place themselves in a position to obtain it, or they
will become peasants. You might as well meet this issue
squarely and those who are pussy-footing around only hinder
the final contest.""^
While Reno worked to defeat the domestic allotment pro-
posal, Wallace worked equally hard to defeat the cost of pro-
duction amendment. In part Wallace opposed the cost of pro-
duction plan because it did not provide for production con-
"Wallace to Dwight McDonald, December 18, 1932, HWP.
"Reno to Oren Herbert, January 11, 1933, MRP.
"The New York Times, March 19, 1932.
"Reno to A. A. Rose, May 6, 1933, MRP.
"Reno to Cecil Johnson, February 16, 1933, MRP.
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trois, but he also objected to the plan for purely pragmatic
reasons. Worried about administering the plan should it be-
come law, Wallace wrote to Roosevelt,
. . . I am convinced there is no satisfactory yard stick by wbich to
measure cost of production. Each farm differs. Moreover, there
are many different methods of keeping books. Also there are im-
portant differences as to what constitutes cost of production."'
Although Reno and Wallace had similar objectives, Reno was
filled with despair when the cost of production amendment
went down to defeat. On May 11, the day before Roosevelt
signed the new farm bill into law, he wrote to William A.
Hirth, head of the Missouri Farmers' Association, that he in-
terpreted the defeat of the cost of production amendment as a
determined effort to ignore the farmers' right to a decent stan-
dard of living. He concluded ominously.
To me, the whole question is, where do we go from here . . . . As
far as I, myself, am concerned, I have very little choice between a
communistic government enforced by a bayonet, and a capital-
istic autocracy, maintained by the same military tyranny."
Reno quickly determined that it was necessary to continue his
fight against the domestic allotment plan and to work for new
legislation which would incorporate the cost of production
concept.
Reno's criticisms of the New Deal, which he developed in
the remaining months of 1933, illustrate that Reno and Wal-
lace were much closer than either imagined in their hopes for
the future of American agriculture. Along with many other
critics of the Roosevelt leadership, Reno pointed out the con-
tradiction of carrying out a program based upon "scarcity eco-
nomics" while millions of Americans in the land of plenty
faced want and hunger. In October, after admitting the need
for balanced production, Reno argued he was " . . . in com-
plete disagreement as to Wallace's plan which is to reduce
production to the present consumption, which means twenty-
"Wallace to Roosevelt, April 11, 1933, FDRL, OF 1.
"Agricultural Stablization Service (Formerly referred to as Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration), National Farm Holiday Association, Reno to William Hirth, May 11, 1933,
NARS, RG 145.
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five million hungry people and at least fifteen practically fac-
ing starvation.""' Charging that the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration's programs were "criminal" and "un-Ameri-
can," he concluded "I am certain that their program cannot
succeed, because it is wrong and any program that is not right,
its ultimate end is failure.""*
While the administration was not willing to abandon its
farm program, officials in Washington were equally distressed
by the enigma of starvation and abundant agricultural pro-
duction. In an effort to partially remedy the situation, Roose-
velt announced at a press conference on September 21, 1933
that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration would buy
surplus food and clothing for the needy unemployed. The food
and clothing were to be turned over to the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration, which in turn gave the surplus com-
modities to individual state relief administrations for distribu-
tion."' For greater efficiency in purchasing and distributing
the products, a new federal agency, the Federal Surplus Relief
Corporation, was created on October 4, 1933. Although the
New Deal's response did not resolve the contradiction of want
in the midst of plenty—millions of Americans were without
adequate food throughout the 1930s—Roosevelt had at least
recognized the problem and had made a tentative move to re-
solve the dilemma."' Although Reno effectively used the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration's control features as a
springboard to attack the New Deal, it is difficult to see how
the cost of production plan would have improved the plight of
poor people in the United States. Reno, whose position was
very similar to George Peek's, the leading conservative within
the administration who opposed production controls, might
argue that the domestic allotment plan was economic idiocy
"Reno to W. H. Borman, October 3, 1933, MRP.
"Reno to S. P. Free, October 27, 1933; see also Reno to W. J. Fraze, October 29, 1933;
Reno to James J. Corcoran, November 9, 1933, MRP.
"Henry A. Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1934), 183.
"Roosevelt Memorandum to Peek, Wallace, and Hopkins, September 11, 1933 FDRL;
OF-l-K; Press Conference #54, September 21, 1933, 270-284; the New York Times, September
22, 1933; Rosenman (comp.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D Roosevelt. 11,
362-363, 370-372.
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and that the problem was one of distribution and under-
consumption, but he failed to develop an alternative to the
market-price system of capitalism. Reno's first goal continued
to be to raise agricultural prices, the same goal which
dominated the New Deal's approach to agriculture throughout
the decade ofthe 1930s. Reno's real complaint was not that
there was hunger in the land, but that the price of food was
not high enough.^'
Another argument which the Farmers' Holiday Associa-
tion leader developed to attack Roosevelt's farm program in
late 1933 was that it was leading the United States toward the
path of dictatorship. Although Reno, like Wallace, had once
concluded that state socialism was preferable to unregulated
capitalism, he decided that Wallace's farm program was lead-
ing to centralization and to the destruction of traditional con-
stitutional freedoms."* He complained that "The program
they are trying to force down the farmer's throat is uneco-
nomic, unchristian and inhuman, and is doomed to failure,
unless it is the intention to Russianize American agriculture,
which I do not believe we are ready for yet."^^ Viewing the ad-
ministration from the outside while Wallace's prestige and in-
fluence within the Roosevelt camp increased daily, a bitter
and frustrated Milo Reno concluded that " . . . nothing short
of a complete dictatorship for agriculture will satisfy the ad-
ministration.""
Closely related to Reno's charge that the New Deal was
subverting the democratic process was the contention that
Wallace formed an alliance between the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the extension service, and the federal gov-
ernment. Reno believed that the extension service was merely
a tool ofthe American Farm Bureau Federation which in turn
was a tool of big business." He concluded, "I am sorry to say
"Reno to Frank Ingram, November 22. 1933 MRP; Reno to C, D, Satterfield. August 22,
1933; on Peek see Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity.
'"Reno to Morris Self, July 10, 1933. MRP.
"Reno to W. H, Borman, October 3. 1933, MRP,
"Reno to W, J. Mullis, December 12, 1933, MRP.
"For an extended discussion see William J. Block, The Separation ofthe Farm Bureau and
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that the agricultural program under Secretary Wallace means
only one thing, to re-establish the county agents as federal
agents and to increase by thousands the lice that already infest
this Republic as government employees." Reno further
charged that the hierarchy of power in rural America repre-
sented only the wealthy farmers and excluded the interests of
the poor. *" When Wallace turned to the county agents and the
extension service to aid in implementing and administering
the early Agricultural Adjustment Administration program,
Reno was convinced that the New Deal was beyond redemp-
tion.
Although Reno's charges contained more than an element
of truth, it is difficult to see that Wallace had any other alter-
native, if the farm program were to be initiated with speed, but
to turn to the extension service. It was virtually the only orga-
nizational structure in rural America that could be quickly
adapted to the administrative needs of the New Deal. Al-
though Wallace was indeed close to the extension service and
looked to Edward O'Neal, president of the American Farm
Bureau Federation, with respect, his eyes were not closed to
the weaknesses of the county agent system." He pointed out
that the county agents had dedicated too much time to trying
to increase economic efficiency, and not enough to trying to
improve the general economic position of the farmer."
Wallace realized that rural militants and representatives of
the American Farm Bureau Federation were far apart on
many issues, but he hoped that a common ground could be
found in the New Deal to unite all farm factions. Wallace real-
ized that the domestic allotment system would give the exten-
sion service more prestige and institutional support, but he
looked upon their activities as a way of democratizing the farm
program, not as a step towards establishing a centralized
the Extension Service: Political Issue in a Federal System (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1960).
s'Reno to Morris Self, September 15, 1933. MRP.
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bureaucracy. While Wallace admitted that many of the county
agents were "rather dumb," he could not agree that they were
"blood sucking parasites" and continued to believe that their
hearts were in the right place." Ultimately, however, his deci-
sion to support the extension service was based upon expedi-
ency as much as deeply felt convictions. He wrote to Guy B.
Park, governor of Missouri,
The existing extension set-up is so well fitted and its personnel
so well trained and prepared to attack the large problems of pro-
duction adjustment which confront us, that the thing to do is now
to move them into action in this direction, with all possible local
and, for the most part, volunteer backing and aid.*'
Throughout the remaining years of the 1930s Henry Wallace
worked hard to guarantee farmers a reasonable income, to
bring relief to the poor, and to make the administration of the
farm program more democratic. He did so, not because of the
attacks of Milo Reno, but rather because he shared the same
basic goals and convictions as the leader of the Farmers' Holi-
day Association. Although Wallace and Reno disagreed on the
domestic allotment plan and the cost of production amend-
ment, their disagreement was based upon method, not upon
their immediate objectives for the rural community. Even on
the question of tactics Reno and Wallace shared many of the
same assumptions, at least until Wallace became secretary of
agriculture, about how their objectives could be realized.
One of the most dramatic developments of the early 1930s
was the emergence of the farm strike, championed by Reno
and the Holiday Association, as a new technique to restore
prosperity to the agricultural community. As early as 1927
Reno had suggested that if legislators failed to respond to
farmers' demands the farm community should go on strike by
withholding their products from market. " Reno was undoubt-
edly aware, as many of his critics pointed out, that the farm
strike made little economic sense, unless it was accompanied
by controlled production, since the eventual release of the pro-
"Wallace to Griswold, May 20, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to Guy B. Park, April 25, 1933, HWP.
"Schlesinger, Crisis of the Old Order, 268.
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ducts stored on the farm would drive prices down again.'"Al-
though Reno apparently reasoned that the farm strike might
cause a temporary rise in farm prices, he viewed the strike as
an instrument which could be used to accomplish much more
than simply raising agricultural prices.
Reno believed that the farm strike, by dramatically spot-
lighting the farmers' problems, would attract support from
the non-farm population by appealing to their moral con-
sciences. Reno wrote to Howard Chapman, "A good general
will not needlessly sacrifice his men, even though it sometimes
requires fortitude and patience in waiting for the psychologi-
cal time to strike." Reno warned that farmers must have cost
of production, ". . . o r else they will strike in a way that will
startle the world, and, if justified in doing so, will have the
moral support of all thinking, patriotic people."*' Reno also
believed that the government was controlled by "vested inter-
ests" and that the farm strike could be used to threaten the
enemies of agriculture and to force positive action by the
government on the behalf of the farm community. In August,
1932, Reno launched the first major farm strike in the Middle
West. As the movement spread throughout Iowa and into
neighboring states, farmers blocked roads, dumped milk, and
spread nails on the highways to prevent agricultural supplies
from fiowing into the cities. Although the farm strike failed to
raise prices, Reno believed that the strike had had the thera-
peutic effect of frightening the industrial East. He wrote to A.
W. Ricker, an official of the Farmers' Union, that ". . . if the
Farmers' Holiday was never heard of again in the world, it has
done more to raise h-1 with the vested interests than the farm
organizations have done in a quarter of a century.""
While Reno hoped to dramatize the farmers' plight and
hoped to challenge the supremacy of the industrial East, the
direct action programs of the Farmers' Holiday Association
were not intended to effect radical changes in American life.
'"Ibid.
"Reno to Howard Chapman, June 22, 1933, MRP.
''Reno to A. W. Ricker, February 3, 1933, MRP.
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Even when the Holiday Association violated the law, as it did
when it forcibly halted mortgage foreclosures, or when it de-
frauded mortgage holders through the "penny auction" rebel-
lion, Reno's intentions were clearly conservative. " He wanted
to protect the farmers' property and keep them on the land so
they could faithfully "serve society" as they had for the past
century and a half." Similarly, Reno viewed the Fanners'
Holiday Association not only as an organization which would
strike to promote the interests of agriculture, but also as an
agency to save the Republic from outside threats. He wrote to
George S. Taylor that his organization
. , . has accomplished more in the ten months of its existence, in
arousing the moral conscience of all groups of society as to the
unthinkable conditions not only of the American farmer, but the
starvation, privation and want in a land of super-abundance, "
Reno actually feared that the farm strike movement might get
out of hand and would lead to violence and chaos. In Septem-
ber, 1933, just before Reno called the last major strike of the
Holiday Association, he wrote to E. A. Sherrill that he hoped
that a strike could be avoided " . . . because in the confused
state of mind of the people, not only of this Republic but of
other nations, a strike might easily have the same effect as a
lighted match thrown into a powder mill."**
By the fall of 1933, while worrying about the implications
of another strike, Reno became convinced that the New Deal
would not work and that although Roosevelt had made "her-
culean efforts" to save the farmer, the government had fallen
into the hands of bankers, racketeers, and moneyed inter-
ests.*' As usual, Wallace was singled out by Reno for special
condemnation. Reno charged that Wallace was a tool of Wall
Street who was primarily responsible for the farmers' continu-
"See John L. Shover, "The Penny-Auction Rebellion." The American West. 11 (Fall,
1%5), 64-72.
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ing dilemma. On September 7 Reno wrote "I attribute the un-
fair treatment of agriculture very largely to the economic
idiocy of Henry Wallace, who has not the ability and I doubt if
he has the inclination to serve the class he is supposed to
represent.""
Warning that "no man knows what the end will be," on
October 21 Reno called for a national farm strike.*' Reno
charged that Wallace's program was a bribe from the same
old dealers using the same stacked deck and contended that
the strike would determine whether the farmer would retain
his independence or would " . . . become a peasant, the
menial slave ofthe usurers and the industrialists."'" Reno
again insisted, as he had in 1932, that the strike was the only
effective way to force Washington to respond to the agricul-
tural crisis. Reno argued, "The farmers' strike now in pro-
gress is the only weapon the farmers have left to compel recog-
nition and fair treatment. We are going to strike until agricul-
ture is given its rightful place in the economic and social sun of
this nation." " As the strike movement got underway Reno un-
doubtedly received some satisfaction when an effigy of Wal-
lace was spanked at a mass meeting of the Farmers' Holiday
Association near Shenandoah, Iowa. " It was soon apparent,
however, that Reno had overplayed his hand. Although he
continued to demand that something be done about mortgage
foreclosures, that the government expand the currency, and
that farmers be given cost of production, Reno realized that
the strike had failed and consequently called it to an end on
November 19. " He managed to fire a parting shot at Wallace,
however, when he warned, "The responsibility for whatever
happens in the future will rest squarely on the shoulders of the
administration and Secretary Wallace in particular.'""
Milo
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Although Reno excoriated Wallace as the arch enemy of
the strike movement, the secretary's views were not as far from
those of the Holiday Association as Reno would have liked to
believe. While frequently ambivalent about the strike, Wal-
lace, before he became secretary of agriculture, had ex-
pressed open sympathy for striking farmers and seemed to in-
dicate that he would support the movement if it offered hope
for the future. Wallace was not offended by the strikers'
tactics, or by their objectives, but he did fear that the strike
was doomed to failure and would divide farmers against them-
selves. On June 22, 1932, before Reno had launched his first
strike, Wallace observed, "The farm strike is merely a symbol.
It might be all right if it was possible to organize the farmers
more effectively. Unfortunately farmers are so separated by
distance and by temperament and by economic background
that an effort of this sort at the present time is bound to be im-
potent."" Wallace admitted that the strike would have
dramatic effects and might be a
, , , way of waking up the people of this country to what is hap-
pening to the farmers at the present time. I have been trying to
think of something that will turn the trick but haven't discovered
it yet. Perhaps we shouldn't be too critical of these farmers' Holi-
day folks until we get a real idea of our own along this line,"
As the presidential campaign of 1932 unfolded Wallace ad-
vised Roosevelt that in his campaign against Hoover he should
deprecate the violence of the Farmers' Holiday Association,
but should also point out that the system had failed the Ameri-
can farmer. In language which resembled Reno's own, he
wrote the Democratic candidate.
You can see that there is real excuse for these men engaging in
direct action when they feel that for 10 years the leadership of
this country has been both unintelligent and unsympathetic. In
my opinion, the economic abuses from which they have suffered
have been more severe than those from which the colonists suf-
fered during the period from 1763 to 1775, The holiday move-
'^  Wallace to Jacobus De Vries, June 22, 1932; see also Wallace to J. K. Whitehill, AprU 28,
1932; Wallace to Grover Arbeiter, September 18, 1932. HWP.
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ment may well prove to be a Boston Tea Party if we do not get rid
of our Lord Norths and George Ill 's."
When Reno launched his second strike, this time against Wal-
lace, the secretary, although he questioned Reno's motives,
continued to defend the farmers' position. He wrote to his
friend, Otha Wearin,
Frankly, while I don't like the bitter spirit in which the farm
strike is being pushed, I don't favor the idea of breaking up
movements of this sort as long as the fundamental situation is
bad. It appears to me as the same kind of thing as killing the
nerve of an aching tooth. We need to be reminded that the pain is
there so that we can strive more energetically to remedy the
fundamental wrong."
Wallace may have objected to Reno's leadership, but he did
not question the farmers' right to strike.
Reno and Wallace were united, not by their defense of
radical tactics, but by their basic conservatism. Although
Reno and Wallace on occasion sounded radical and found
their thought leading logically to revolutionary conclusions,
both wanted gradual reforms to save the system, not to destroy
it. Wallace in particular realized that the traditional Christian
values of frugality, industry, and thrift, would have to be
modified to meet the needs of modern society. " As he studied
the Depression his analysis, coupled with his desire to bring
social justice to America, led him to attack the very founda-
tions of the capitalist system. In May, 1932, he wrote,
I am beginning to think that what we really need is a type of
Christian communism which includes some of the very real good
points of capitalism and cooperation. I am afraid it is going to
take a lot of suffering before the wealthy people of the United
States learn their lesson.'"
A month later he observed that although farmers were patri-
otic and wanted to avoid violence, they legitimately demanded
"Wallace to Roosevelt, September 22, 1932, HWP.
"Wallace to Otha Wearin, November 1, 1933, NARS, RG 16.
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", . . a peaceful revolution which will bring about a modern
up-to-date social machinery for justice in the distribution of
our national income between the classes. It is time to write a
Declaration of Independence along these lines."*' While Wal-
lace did not systematically attack the "business elite," and
actually collaborated with "progressive" business leaders like
Henry I. Harriman, he did argue that the country was "half
slave and half free" and urged farmers to organize a counter-
vailing power to balance the power of industry and labor."
Wallace refused, however, to embrace a revolutionary vision
of the future. He was willing to be a political maverick, to
abandon the Republican Party, and even to fiirt with the pos-
sibilities of establishing a third party, but not radical enough
to reject the American political tradition. Wallace concluded
that values in America could be changed, and the proper eco-
nomic balance restored, by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
New Deal."
Milo Reno also, at least until late 1933, believed that
Roosevelt would work to end the agricultural depression and
would try to establish "more equal distribution" of wealth in
the country. '* He blamed the many enigmas of the New Deal
and the continuing agricultural depression not on Roosevelt,
but upon the "ambitious" and "unscrupulous" men around
the president." Although he expressed faith in Roosevelt's
leadership, he also appeared to question whether the existing
political order was workable. Big business interests, along
with sycophants like Wallace, were, in Reno's mind, responsi-
ble for the corruption of the political system. Reno reasoned.
Big business has always been able, regardless of the political
party in power, to obtain in one way or another the concessions
and privileges that they desired, while the farmer has been
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juggled with, used as a political pawn. His leadership has been
taken up into the high mountain and shown the kingdoms that
he might be able to rule, if he was tractable and conservative.
Organizations have been built for him under the hypocritical
pretense of furthering his interests, when in fact, they were the
stool pigeons of big business and used by big business to deceive
the public, making it believe that the representative of such orga-
nizations spoke for the farmers,"
Although Reno frequently sounded revolutionary as he in-
veighed against the "interests," he was most certainly afraid
of the consequences of revolution. He promised to "go down
fighting for the principles upon which this government was
builded" and argued that the Republic was threatened by ex-
tremists on the left and right. " Like Wallace, Reno sought to
restore balance to the economy and, like the secretary, be-
lieved that the system could be used to meet the challenge of
the Depression, provided of course, that the system was in the
proper hands. He observed, "There is no measure of correc-
tion, no act of justice and equity, that cannot be accomplished
under and by the authority of the constitution of the United
States, if it is interpreted in the spirit of the Declaration of In-
dependence."" Reno especially feared communism, not only
because it represented an alternative to capitalism, but also
because it presented a threat to the existing religious heirarchy
in the United States. Although his theology was perhaps not as
sophisticated as Wallace's, they both wished to preserve the
Christian tradition. Reno, linking Christianity and capitalism,
observed, as 1933 came to a close:
I . . . am convinced, that when you destroy the gospel of the
Christ, that spiritually men will be sailing unchartered seas with-
out guide or compass. Perhaps they will be wrecked. Maybe out
of their spiritual desolation they may find another harbor, and
when we politically have abandoned the foundation upon which
this government was builded, we will be occupying exactly the
same position. Maybe in the desolation and destruction that fol-
"Reno to J. S. Wilson, February 2, 1933, MRP.
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Reno and Wallace 429
lows revolution, that invariably loses all chartered courses of
human relationship, we may land on the rocks and become casta-
ways, all of orderly processes lost, and the human race pass
through another period of dark ages. Perhaps one chance in a
million that out of the turbulence of revolution, we might enter
an economic haven that would be superior to our present ideas
of human relationship, but it seems to me our responsibility,
today, is to, as nearly as possible, adjust our affairs in equity to
all who serve and, in order to do so, we must protect the founda-
tion upon which our economic life depends which, first, is pro-
duction; second, processing; and, third, distribution.*'
When Henry A. Wallace was chosen as Roosevelt's secre-
tary of agriculture, William Hirth wrote to Milo Reno that he
feared that Wallace would be a "hair-splitter."'" In the
fiercely partisan decade ofthe 1930s the phrase was a favorite
epithet used to brand one's opponent as an impractical ideal-
ist whose capacity for obscuring concrete issues with vague
ideological pronouncements was exceeded only by his inability
to deal with concrete political problems. Although his concern
may have been justified, he might well have written the same
letter to Wallace about Reno. Their debate, in 1932 and 1933,
was indeed a classic confrontation of hair-splitters.
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